The Return Of IS written by Muhammad Amir Rana

Muhammad Amir Rana

                                 The Return of IS

THE operation to liberate the Iraqi city of Mosul from the grip of the militant Islamic State group may take a few more weeks, or maybe even months. But the fear of foreign fighters affiliated with IS returning to their home countries is intensifying in the international community, mainly Europe.

According to various estimates, since 2012, more than 30,000 men and women from over 100 countries — including Pakistan and its neighbours — have

travelled to join various militant groups, mainly IS, in Iraq and Syria. These include not only fighters but also their families, who migrated to Syria on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s call for hijra to support the newly established ‘Islamic caliphate’. Many of these families are now planning to return to their hometowns due to the intensifying conflict in the region.

Many nations are gravely concerned about the possible threat these returning fighters and their families could pose to their security. While the returning fighters will possess the skills to launch terrorist attacks, the families themselves could contribute to the process of radicalisation. These fears are based on the fact that many of those who returned to Europe in the past have shown violent intent, and some have even participated in terrorism.

IS is not a cohesive group and is prone to erosion; the emergence of a new movement cannot be ruled out.

The spree of terrorist attacks observed in different regions across the world before and after the month of Ramazan this year has made it evident that IS has the potential to transform itself into a global terrorist network. As a terrorist group, IS will pose a much bigger threat to global security compared to Al Qaeda due to its abundant human resources and the strong logistical support base it enjoys — especially in the West, from where the group has brought thousands of youth into its fold.

Many experts believe that the factors and tendencies of violent extremism are deeply rooted in the sociopolitical structures of Muslim countries, which, they argue, then nurtured Islamist movements. Such movements trigger certain violent trends, a few of which initially shaped Al Qaeda and then IS. Those counterterrorism experts who believe in generational theory and study radical movements in a combination of anthropological and political perspectives see the development as yet another transformation taking place among violent Islamist groups.

IS is not a cohesive group and is prone to erosion. In this transformation, Al Qaeda can become stronger again. IS affiliates that were previously part of or close to Al Qaeda may rejoin their parent group. Similarly, those radicals at the fringes may prefer to join Al Qaeda rather than an apparently decaying IS. Chances of the emergence of a new movement, with hyper-ideological and political motives, cannot be ruled out.

A couple of months ago, local media highlighted the news of some 650 Pakistani families who had reportedly migrated to Iraq, Syria and other conflict zones. These reports quoted official sources and underscored concerns that the defeat of IS could put pressure on Pakistan and might add to sectarian strife in the country.

It is difficult to predict exactly how those returning to Pakistan from Iraq and Syria will behave. Looking at the country’s complex militant landscape and persisting diverse extremist tendencies, it can be argued that a new security challenge is emerging. At the same time, it’s not just Pakistani national fighters who will enter the country, foreign-national fighters, particularly those belonging to the Central Asian states and Uighur militants of Xinjiang, might also prefer to operate in this region, especially in Afghanistan where they will find sanctuaries along the border with Pakistan.

If they return, it will mean that IS’s Khorasan chapter will become stronger. Recently, a Nato spokesperson confirmed that around 1,000 IS terrorists are currently operating in three districts of Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. New fighters will not only add to the strength of existing IS affiliates in Afghanistan, but will bring experience as well. At the same time, although IS attempts to expand beyond Nangarhar have been unsuccessful thus far, the group is creating space for itself in Farah, Faryab, Badakhshan, Kunar and Logar provinces. The Nangarhar chapter mainly consists of Pakistani militants who fled from Khyber, Mohmand, Orakzai and Bajaur agencies following military operations in Fata. Returnees will prefer to join their ranks, and the central IS command may also advise them to do so.

In Pakistan, the impact of the IS was diverse. Initially, many militant groups had welcomed the new terrorist movement in the region. However, IS’s strategy remained selective, which discouraged many groups, but strengthened sectarian narratives and certain sectarian groups. The real damage the group caused in Pakistan was giving inspiration to non-violent radical groups and banned militant groups.

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The IS inspiration made inroads inside some small Islamist groups like Tanzeem-i-Islami, small circles within Jamaat-i-Islami, and the banned Hizbut Tahrir. Jamaatud Dawa was the second major victim of the IS intrusion and also lost members to IS. This may be due to two reasons: the Salafi credentials of both groups and the ideological and political dilemma that JuD faces. JuD was originally a militant group that contributed to the construction of the jihadist culture and narratives in Pakistan. One critical aspect of JuD is its urban organisational structure in Punjab. This mainly focuses on engaging families, compared to other religious and militant groups that operate primarily in the ‘male’ domain.

When IS-inspired families return, they will cause further problems for the Islamist groups and JuD. That they may introduce IS-inspired ideological and political narratives to their respective groups, which will cause divisions within their ranks and increase the likelihood of the establishment of a separate ultra-radical group, cannot be ruled out.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have both failed to evaluate the real threat of IS. Afghanistan is vulnerable because of expanding frenzied territories, and Pakistan’s challenge is complex because of the multiple types of militant groups with their varying ideological tendencies and sectarian credentials — a scenario that encourages the creation of new trends and groups.

The writer is a security analyst.